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The invention of Arkady Shevchenko, supermole.

THE SPY WHO CAME IN TO BE SOLD

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

ARKADY SHEVCHENKO, the under secretary general who mysteriously defected from his post in the United Nations Secretariat some seven years ago, reemerged in February on CBS's *60 Minutes* in a new role: a Le Carréan supermole. While ostensibly working as a United Nations bureaucrat, he was, the report revealed, the CIA's most successful spy. "Nothing like it had ever before occurred," it was authoritatively reported. For the quality of his access to Soviet state secrets, he was compared to "Al Haig, when he was deputy to Henry Kissinger." The broadcast further disclosed that this espionage coup had been such an extraordinarily closely held secret that no more than five men—including the president of the United States—had known about it.

Shevchenko was portrayed equally graphically the next morning on the cover of *Time* magazine, which featured a gaping man-size hole in the brick wall of the Kremlin. In the dramatic breach, below an exposed red hammer and sickle, the cover line read: "A Defector's Story: The highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to break with Moscow since World War II describes the Kremlin's inner workings." The special section inside was condensed from Shevchenko's book *Breaking With Moscow*, and imaginatively illustrated with artist's renderings of his espionage career.

Breaking with Moscow
by Arkady N. Shevchenko
(Knopf, 378 pp., $18.95)

It was, according to *Time*, "far more than a true-life spy story. . . ." *Time*'s executive editor described it as "windows on history." To further enhance its credibility, Strobe Talbott, *Time*'s Washington bureau chief, noted on the publisher's page: "Those of us working on the project thought it important to verify the bona fides of the author and, as far as it was possible, his story." The lead paragraph began dramatically with Shevchenko's disappearance from the U.N. on "Friday, April 6, 1978." (In fact, Friday that year fell on April 7.) With this bold send-off, the film rights were quickly sold for a half-million dollars, and the book itself rose to the top of the best-seller lists.

It was not always, however, such a success story. Originally Shevchenko's value as a source of reliable information was much more modestly appraised. In October 1978—after Shevchenko was filmed by NBC News in a Washington restaurant with a call girl named Judy Chavez, to whom he had paid most of the $60,000 that he received from the CIA as his annuity—*Time* reported that "the CIA has been relatively lax with Shevchenko because he has been far less valuable as an intelligence source than had been anticipated." The magazine concluded, based on its intelligence sources, that "he had little knowledge of the inner workings of current Soviet policies or intelligence operations."

This assessment was shared in the intelligence community—at least in 1979. For example, analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency, with full access to the "take" from what Shevchenko had told his FBI and CIA interrogators, concluded that the defector had nothing of value to offer American intelligence, aside from some dated biographical material. Book publishers, moreover, were similarly disappointed. In the summer of 1978 Simon and Schuster signed a $600,000 contract with Shevchenko, who was then represented by Morton Janklow, for a book tentatively titled *From Captivity into Freedom*. When the manuscript finally was submitted in 1979, Richard Snyder, the head of Simon and Schuster, and Michael Korda, the editor-in-chief, concluded that it did not contain sufficient new material about the Soviet Union to merit its publication. There were no revelatory firsthand conversations with Soviet leaders—and no mention of any espionage activities by him. In addition to rejecting the book, Simon and Schuster successfully sued Shevchenko for the $146,875 it had actually advanced him. Even with $600,000 at stake, however, he was not willing to claim he was a mole. When he was deposed by Simon and Schuster's lawyers in December 1980, he still steadfastly maintained that he had accurately described his defection in his chapter "Decision to Defect," which made no mention of any espionage activities on his part.

The book was sent next to the Reader's Digest Press. Steven Frimmer, the editor-in-chief, also concluded that it lacked both substance about the workings of the Soviet system and personal vignettes. Before rejecting it, however, Henry Hurt, the star investigative reporter of *Reader's Digest*, intensively interviewed Shevchenko for some 20 hours to ascertain whether Shevchenko could add, possibly with his collabora-

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tion, the sort of concrete and firsthand information that could make a publishable book. Hurt decided that Shevchenko's reminiscences were far too vague for a successful book. (Hurt, who was himself writing a book about Soviet spies, also pressed Shevchenko about espionage—without success.) At this point, in 1981, Shevchenko told a friend that he "gave up" with the book.

Some three years later, in 1984, Ashbel Green, a respected editor at Knopf, received a completed manuscript that had been forwarded by Shevchenko's lawyer, William Geimer. The book was no longer simply *From Captivity into Freedom*. It had all the elements of a spy thriller. It began with a new section, called "The Reluctant Spy," which described a whole new supermole career Shevchenko allegedly had before his defection, replete with cinematic car chases, CIA case officers in safe houses, meetings with the KGB *rezident*, spy equipment, and escapes from danger. It also had a new final chapter, appropriately titled "The End of the Game," describing his flight to freedom. Sandwiched between these new espionage sections were some of the original chapters—which now had dramatic verbatim conversations with Soviet leaders. Nikita Khrushchev, for example, was quoted at great length speaking privately to the author, then a 29-year-old junior aide in the Foreign Ministry, about such state matters as Castro, the rift with the Chinese Communists, and his orders to "get rid of" U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld "by any means." Such supplemental material guaranteed that *Breaking with Moscow* would be published. But where did the material come from?



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As it turns out, much of the material about Shevchenko's espionage career has either been spun out of formulaic spy fiction or invented out of whole cloth. Consider, for example, the extended chase scene that begins the book. Ambassador Shevchenko is driving his car through the dense rush-hour traffic on the Long Island Expressway on a Friday night in late 1975. He had purposefully given his chauffeur the night off. His "carefully laid plans" involved driving 25 miles to the Glen Cove exit; then doubling back to New York City to meet a CIA officer in an East Side town house, a block from where he lived; then returning to the Soviet compound at Glen Cove, where he was spending the weekend.

Suddenly he spies in the rearview mirror a Buick sedan, which he suspects may be a KGB "surveillance car" following him. "I had to know if it was a tail," he writes. Therefore he speeds up to 75 miles an hour, weaving from lane to lane, and then, "barely braking," he swerves sharply onto the exit ramp for Glen Cove, where he is pulled over by a Nassau County policeman and given a traffic ticket. He decides "not to invoke diplomatic immunity" to avoid arousing further suspicion. Then he proceeds to his secret rendezvous, where he is offered the job of being a CIA mole. Finally, at midnight, he returns to the Soviet compound. (How he explained the missing five hours and the extra 50 miles on the car's odometer, especially if he indeed had evaded the "surveillance car," is itself not explained.)

THE PROBLEM with this exciting chase, despite all the cinematic detail, is that it never happened. According to police records, Shevchenko did not receive a ticket in 1975, when the incident was supposed to have occurred—or in any other year—on either a New York or an international driver's license. In fact, he did not even have a driving license at the time. He obtained it on October 20, 1977. (If he had an international license, it would have lapsed in 1974.) Nor did he have his own car. He was shuttled to Glen Cove and back, along with other officials, by limousines belonging to the Soviet Mission. Thus he could not have plausibly dismissed the chauffeur, driven the car on a wild chase, and received a ticket.

Shevchenko also describes a series of suspenseful clandestine meetings he had with Americans in the "otherwise empty" reference section of the U.N. library. He claims that there, in the best tradition of spy suspense, he exchanged messages in dead drops. The U.N. library, however, is not the sort of darkened, cloistered room featured in spy novels. On two sides the reference section is exposed by plate-glass windows to onlookers in the busy corridor and street. On a third side it is in the direct line of sight—and 20 feet away from—the head librarian, who, at the time of the alleged meetings, was not only a Soviet official, but, according to a CIA officer then at the U.N., presumed to be in the KGB. Under Secretary General Shevchenko's meetings in this particular library, aside from creating quite a stir (high-ranking officials are rarely seen doing research), would almost unavoidably have taken place under observation of his Soviet comrades.

The chronology of intrigue is also seriously flawed. Shevchenko dates his initial secret contact with the Americans to *after* his summer home leave in Russia in 1975. During these early meetings, he writes, John Scali was ambassador to the U.N.—and that he debated going directly to him. But this is an

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anachronism: Scali was replaced by Daniel Patrick Moynihan as U.N. ambassador at the end of June 1975.

Furthermore, Moynihan, when he was later vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and in a position to verify exact dates, wrote in *The New York Times* that he learned "on Friday December 5, 1975, . . . Shevchenko, Under Secretary General of the United Nations, had told an American in the Secretariat that he wished to defect." Immediately afterward, according to Moynihan, the first meeting was arranged. Shevchenko flatly states that after this initial contact, several weeks elapsed before he actually met with the CIA. This means that the Friday night car chase took place, at the earliest, on December 19th, and that his next meeting, in which he agreed to take the job of spying, could not have occurred before December 26th (when he was on Christmas vacation at the Hotel Carillon in Miami). In any case, he says he took another week deciding whether or not to accept the job. His spy career thus could not have begun before 1976. Yet the book details a wealth of espionage coups Shevchenko accomplished on behalf of the CIA *before* "the end of 1975." These anachronistic achievements include reports on the "Brezhnev-Kosygin frictions," "Soviet plans for . . . Angola," the "Soviet positions on arms-control negotiations—SALT and others—including fallback provisions contained in the instructions."

SHEVCHENKO'S spying career in 1976 is also demonstrably fictitious. For example, he tells of how he spied for the CIA that year on the head of the KGB in New York, Boris Aleksandrovich Solomatin—"a short, stocky major general, the *rezident*," as he describes him. Solomatin also merited a shadowy illustration in *Time*. In three pages, Shevchenko gives a verbatim account of a dinner party at Solomatin's New York apartment in 1976 in which the KGB *rezident* and his wife, Vera, met with him and Georgy Arbatov, the Soviet disinformation specialist. They discussed President Ford's chances of winning reelection, the status of the SALT talks, and the plight of the Soviet economy—all of which he relayed to his American case officers.

The problem with this "penetration," despite all the details Shevchenko gives in the book, is that it never happened. There could not have been such a meeting because Solomatin returned to the Soviet Union on July 22, 1975, six months before Shevchenko began his alleged spying for the United States, and over a year before Arbatov would have come to the United States to appraise the presidential elections.

If Shevchenko fabricated the extensive conversations with Solomatin, Arbatov, and others, what is the provenance of the verbatim conversations he claims he had with Khrushchev on Castro, Nixon, Kennedy, de Gaulle, Mao, Hammarskjöld, and assorted Eastern European leaders? Although Shevchenko asserts in *Breaking with Moscow* that he had these intimate talks with the Soviet leader when he was a 29-year-old fellow passenger on the ocean liner *Baltika*, they were not in the chapter "With Khrushchev" in the manuscript he submitted to Simon and Schuster. Moreover, in his sworn deposition proceedings, with $600,000 at stake, he insisted that the submitted manuscript reflected all he had to say on the subject. He also denied through his lawyer that there were any additional journals, diaries, or notes. In an interview with Tom Mangold for the BBC in 1979, the only encounter with Khrushchev he could vividly recall was during a large party on the *Baltika*, in which he saw Khrushchev across the room. Nor, in 1980, was he able to provide *Reader's Digest*'s writer with any examples of specific meetings with Khrushchev. How then can he now render, a quarter of a century after the event, without the benefit of any notes, ten pages of verbatim dialogue? (Judy Chavez, the $35,000 escort he rented, furnished one clue to this mystery when she recalled in her book, *Defector's Mistress*, that he had consulted a heavily underlined copy of *Penthouse*, which had a story about the KGB assassinating Hammarskjöld, which in fact does remarkably parallel the account in *Breaking with Moscow*.)

FINALLY, after a series of fictional episodes, the spy's career is abruptly ended by a dramatic "cable of recall" to Moscow, which he receives on March 31, 1978. After ascertaining that there could be "no innocent reason for the summons," he concluded it was his "death sentence" from the KGB, which left him no choice but to defect the next week—even though it meant deserting his wife and daughter. Actually, the telegram he received was not a "recall" cable withdrawing him from his post. It was a request for him to return "for several days of consultations" related to the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament, which Brezhnev himself was to attend, and to "other questions." Since Shevchenko had made other trips to Moscow that year, and frequently consulted with the Foreign Ministry about disarmament policy, especially where it concerned the U.N., this was not in itself an extraordinary message. Shevchenko claimed, however, that he knew that the plans for the Special Session were already set, and that there could be no other reasons for the requests. "What could be so pressing as to require a trip now?" Shevchenko asks rhetorically.

But there was one possible reason for the telegram on March 31 that Shevchenko omits to mention. It was announced the same day that Cyrus Vance, the secretary of state, had agreed to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow on April 20 to attempt to overcome the impasse in the SALT talks. Since Secretary of State Vance's mini-summit, which had not been planned, directly concerned the disarmament talks and the U.N. Session on Disarmament, Shevchenko could hardly be surprised that he was asked to consult about its ramifications on the U.N. Special Session, which he had been working on for some 18 months.

JUST as it begins with a fictitious chase, Shevchenko's espionage career ends with one. "I tiptoed to our bedroom door, took one last look at my sleeping wife . . . and then left the apartment." Arriving at the service elevator, he found that "it didn't run after midnight." Unable to use the elevators, he ran down the "twenty flights" of stairs, carrying his bag and briefcase, stumbling occasionally. At the bottom of the dark stairwell he scrambled through a narrow corridor, and then emerged through the service door directly onto 64th Street. (His escape route was dramatically illustrated by *Time*.) The CIA agents were waiting for him in a parked car, motor running.

In fact, the Phoenix, the modern 32-story building at 160 East 65th Street where he lived on the 26th floor, has an automatic service elevator that operates 24 hours a day—as well as a bank of four regular elevators. None of the elevators stops at midnight. Thus Shevchenko had no reason to stumble with his bag-

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gage down 26 flights of steps. Moreover, he could not have gone through the service door, since this door is sealed shut every night at 7:30 p.m.

There is also some question as to whether the woman in bed at whom he took a "last look" was his "sleeping wife." According to the doormen on duty at the Phoenix that night, his wife, Lina, had left earlier in the week with several suitcases, headed in a Soviet limousine to the compound in Glen Cove. Immediately after her departure, they recalled that Shevchenko moved a young "dishy brunette" into the apartment. He also gave them special instructions to let her enter even if he was not at home. She arrived that last night shortly before him, and they both were gone in the morning.

What is fabricated here are not just car chases, meetings, conversations, reports, dates, motives, and espionage activities, but a spy that never was. According to one former national security adviser to the president, who indisputably would have been at the top of the distribution list for such secret information, there could have been no such spy as Shevchenko purported to be without his knowing about it. He stated categorically that it would not have been possible for Shevchenko to have furnished such secrets as the Soviet backup positions on SALT without its coming to his attention. If so, this book dangerously distorts the entire substance of Soviet-American relations by misrepresenting that the United States had secret advantages it never had. The authoritative falsification of a sub-rosa world is especially damaging since the fictive elements cannot easily be tested or verified by ordinary means.

Although the supermole character in the book is wholly or partially invented, Shevchenko himself certainly was a substantial Soviet actor at the United Nations. But who was he? And what was his role in the spy game that was played out by the CIA, FBI, and KGB?

ALTHOUGH *Time* called Shevchenko "the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to break with Moscow," he was not actually a Soviet diplomat at the time of his defection. He was a U.N. employee, one of 24 under secretary generals in the Secretariat. As an under secretary, he was the equivalent not of Alexander Haig but of William Buffum—the American under secretary general. (Both countries are allowed to nominate one of the under secretaries.) He also received virtually no public attention during his tenure, if *The New York Times* index, which does not mention his name a single time between his appointment in 1973 and his defection in 1978, is any measure.

Furthermore, he was not actually an ambassador. The title "ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union," which had been given to him when he went on a propaganda tour of Third World nations in 1972, was strictly nominal. (In 1978, the four actual "ambassador extraordinaries" from the Soviet Union were Troyanovsky, Kharlamov, Makeyev, and Martynenko.) He was never in charge of an embassy or a diplomatic mission. Nor had he ever been a Soviet arms negotiator. He was, to be sure, a senior official. His specialty for two decades had been manipulating information for an elite Western audience. Both as a U.N. functionary and as a Foreign Ministry official, his principal job was putting the best face possible on Soviet arms control proposals, and disparaging American policy.

He had joined the Foreign Ministry in October 1956—after graduating from the Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1954, spending some time at Mosfilm as an aspiring director, then serving in the army as a political officer. In the late 1950s, during the reorganization of the Foreign Ministry, he was assigned to a new section that prepared documentation to support the propaganda offensive against Western strategic weapons. He was responsible for following the nuances of public American disarmament policy. In this capacity, he first came to New York in 1958 as an "attaché" to attend the U.N. Special Session on disarmament. Throughout most of the 1960s he continued working against the United States arms control delegation, both at the U.N. in New York and in Geneva.

BEGINNING in the early 1960s, however, he became involved with a more sinister aspect of manipulating information. He was co-opted by the KGB into surreptitiously preparing material for "the Soviet disinformation apparatus," as he called it in a remarkable interview, after secret testimony in 1980, with the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security. Despite repeated denials about cooperating with the KGB in *Breaking with Moscow*, in this recorded interview he explained how he knowingly prepared subtle disinformation material, intended to promote the impression that the Soviet Union was the "champion of disarmament," which was then disseminated in the West through paid agents. "The KGB asked me and Ambassador Lev Mendelevich to write the disinformation book, which we did," Shevchenko admitted in the interview. "Later, it was published in the West under someone else's name. . . . They found someone in the West with a proper reputation, for which he was paid."

ALONG with his covert assignments, Shevchenko also returned to Moscow to coauthor a three-volume compendium of public assertions on arms control, titled *The Struggle of the Soviet Union for Disarmament*, which effectively codified and updated the Soviet position. In recognition of this work and other material he churned out, he was awarded a doctorate degree from the Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1963. He then resumed his work in New York, attached to the Soviet Mission to the U.N., as the liaison between the Soviet under secretary at the Secretariat and Moscow.

After President Nixon adopted an entirely new stance on arms control in 1970, which stressed bilateral negotiations in the spirit of détente, Shevchenko was recalled to Moscow to assist in commensurately revising the Soviet public position on SALT. He worked at the Foreign Ministry, directly under Gromyko, serving as an adviser on these issues as well as a liaison with Georgy Arbatov's Institute of the United States and Canada, which accordingly had to adjust its covert propaganda to the new line. Arbatov paid a good portion of the salary for Shevchenko, who was given the title of "senior research fellow." (By 1973, under his own name and the pseudonym N. Arkadyev, he had penned some 200 political articles for such publications as *Kommunist*, *International Life*, *New Times*, and *Pravda*.)

In April 1973 Shevchenko returned to the United States to assume the position of under secretary general for political and security council affairs. He acted here no differently from all his Soviet predecessors in this under secretaryship. The principal work of this section of the Secretariat was to prepare position papers for the security

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council and the secretary general on such subjects as disarmament and apartheid. According to those who worked under him, Shevchenko's concern was carefully to vet these papers so that they would be consistent with Moscow's position, and they assumed that important papers were sent to Moscow for careful editing. Ordinarily, according to his senior assistants, he began his day at the Soviet Mission at 67th Street, and then, around 11 a.m., arrived at his office on the 35th floor of the U.N.

This was not, however, Shevchenko's only mission in New York. Apparently he also had been instructed by Moscow to publish a book—this time under his own name, titled *Disarmament: The Soviet Point of View*. Working through an American U.N. employee (who himself became involved in a financial fraud), Shevchenko arranged a meeting in 1974, in the U.N. dining room, with Ashbel Green—the same Knopf editor who 11 years later published *Breaking with Moscow*. He explained, as Green recalls, that Foreign Minister Gromyko had personally approved the project. The contract was signed on February 5, 1975. The book itself, however, which came in chapter by chapter over the next year, was deemed unpublishable. Since this activity was authorized, Shevchenko presumably was filing reports on his contacts for the KGB, as he acknowledged was required.

IN December 1975, while he was still attempting to get out in book form the message about disarmament, he also, according to Moynihan, put out his feeler to the CIA by telling one of his American subordinates at the Secretariat that he wanted to defect. This message was presumably relayed to the FBI, which had primary jurisdiction for counterintelligence at the U.N.

Shevchenko was not, however, the only Soviet official at the U.N. then dangling the offer of information to American intelligence. For the past 13 years there had been a surfeit of such offers, which had deluged the FBI with disinformation. The problem for the FBI was separating potential "moles" from disinformation agents among these volunteers—a crucial difference that proceeded not from the accuracy of information they provided (since disinformation can be partly true and sincere information can be erroneous), but from whether or not they were filing reports back about their contacts to the KGB. Two Soviet officials at the U.N. who were providing information to the FBI in 1975 had come under particular suspicion. One, code-named "Fedora," was a KGB officer who had first made contact in 1962; the other, code-named "Top Hat," represented the GRU, or Soviet military intelligence. In return for the information they supplied on Soviet intelligence, the FBI furnished them American secrets, cleared by an interagency committee, so as to enhance their credibility with their nominal employers—the KGB and the GRU. By 1975, through a counterintelligence investigation of an inadvertent leak, the CIA had concluded that both Soviet diplomats had been disinformation agents under the control of the KGB—not the FBI. (The FBI eventually concurred with this assessment.) Moreover, it was assumed by CIA counterintelligence that most of the other danglers, who had supplied dovetailing tidbits and then returned to Russia, were probably part of the same "disinformation system."

SHEVCHENKO arrived on this subterranean scene at a time when the CIA was in disarray. Its entire counterintelligence staff, headed by James Jesus Angleton, had been purged earlier that year. Its director, William Colby, who had ordered the removal of Angleton, had just been fired himself (though he remained in office until December 31), and the Church Committee was relentlessly investigating past transgressions. Even so, Shevchenko's offer of cooperation would be considered by the CIA in the context of Fedora, Top Hat, and the myriad of other danglers. In assessing this new "walk-in," it would have to decide: Had he spontaneously made contact with the Americans in order to betray his country? Or was he, like the other dispatched danglers, a coopted diplomat with a brief from the KGB who had been sent to confuse the ongoing investigation? And, in either case, was he worth risking further contacts, which might reveal personnel or countersurveillance techniques?

When, and if, these questions were resolved before his dramatic defection is not known. Nor is it clear what secret information he supplied prior to his defection—if he had indeed even continued the clandestine meetings. (The FBI had already pressed Fedora, Top Hat, et al. into identifying the snapshots of KGB and GRU officers working under U.N. cover in New York.)

After his defection Shevchenko was treated more like a free agent than a supermole under CIA control. For example, instead of keeping him in isolation, as was the case with other important spies who defected, Shevchenko was allowed to move into a Washington hotel and regularly hire call girls during the first month after he defected. He also was permitted to contact a literary agent in New York, Morton Janklow, and negotiate a book contract—an arrangement in which, according to his deposition, there was absolutely no CIA interference or restrictions. Yet if he had been working for the CIA for three years prior to his defection, the CIA would have had, if not a binding contract, considerable interest in protecting its source—and his methods. Nor, according to his financial statement divulged in these proceedings, did he receive any lump sum or backpay settlement, which was made in other CIA mole cases. The only money he appears to have received from the government was a consulting fee of $60,000 a year for his post-defection debriefings (in which he compiled reportedly useful biographies on Soviet officials, which were circulated to other friendly intelligence services).

Aside from the espionage scenes in the book, which, as has been demonstrated, are purely fictional, there is no real evidence that whatever valuable information Shevchenko supplied came before rather than after his defection. If it did, it wasn't of significant enough importance to have been known to the two national security advisers who spanned most of his alleged career. Where, then, did the supermole image originate?

SHEVCHENKO did not himself concoct the mole story. Whatever his relations with the CIA were, until 1985 he claimed that he was restricted by "national security" considerations from publicly discussing any prior contacts he may have had with American intelligence officers. The story in its present authoritative form first appeared in 1983 in John Barron's book *The KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*. The story had been released to Barron, the well-connected Washington editor of *Reader's Digest*, by the CIA itself. In an arrangement it had used with him

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before, the CIA dispatched a defector, who was working under contract to the CIA, to hand-deliver to him certain particulars about the Shevchenko case. In such exchanges, the CIA contract employee is briefed on what he can or cannot disclose. (This is an arrangement I personally became aware of when I wrote a book for the *Digest* titled *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, and the CIA sent me Yuri Nosenko.) In turn, to guard against any slips, Barron, as he freely acknowledges, submitted the relevant portions of his last book to the CIA for review.

As Barron learned once before, not all the stories provided to him in this manner were true. In 1976 Joseph Burkholder Smith, a former senior CIA officer in Mexico, published a book that indiscreetly disclosed that the CIA had sent a Soviet defector to deliver Barron a story it had wholly invented. As Smith explained the operation, the "CIA then assisted John Barron with material for his book *The Secret World of Soviet Secret Agents*. He also used our story. . . ." In the case at hand, the defector fed Barron the story that Shevchenko was a supersecret CIA spy for some "30 months."

The CIA did more than merely retroactively establish a highly successful spy for itself. It elevated Shevchenko to a status so important that he was capable, among other things, of keeping the CIA informed of the Soviets' real intentions in the sensitive SALT negotiations. To accomplish this, the CIA had the defector also brief Barron on a putative KGB counterintelligence investigation that sounds like something right out of Graham Greene's novel *The Human Factor*. In this scheme the KGB, after somehow finding out that information had been handed over on arms control, narrowed the list of suspects to three high officials—Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Oleg Troyanovsky, and Shevchenko. The politburo, according to this brief, therefore ordered that these men each be tested by sending them different dummy top secret messages. When one of these "marked cards," as the messages are called, somehow leaked out, the Soviets then, according to this story, knew who among the three was the spy—Shevchenko. But if the CIA had indeed intercepted these top secret communications, or otherwise learned of such a high-level KGB counterintelligence operation, it would have been an intelligence coup ranking with the *Ultra* interceptions in the Second World War. To divulge it in a book—aside from possibly violating the Communications Act of 1934, which prohibits disclosing the methods of intercepting foreign communications—would compromise the CIA's "sources and methods." Under what conditions would the CIA gratuitously funnel such data into a book? "Only if it was untrue," explained a former CIA executive.

THE NEW version of *Breaking with Moscow* was completed two years after the CIA released the story to Barron. According to Ashbel Green, the final product was a collaborative effort. The participants included Shevchenko, who ironically had some experience in surreptitiously authoring books for the KGB "disinformation apparatus," one or more ghostwriters, and the indefatigable Green himself, who, according to a story in *The Washington Post*, "provided the 'sandwich' structure of the book, beginning and ending with 'the spy story.' " The book has proved an immense success for all involved.

The CIA, at a time of concern about KGB espionage successes, now had its own success story—the penetration of the walled city of the Kremlin. Its supermole Arkady Shevchenko in *Breaking with Moscow* proved to be the most successful media-acknowledged spy since Oleg Penkovskiy in *The Penkovskiy Papers*, a putative autobiography that the CIA admitted, in testimony before the Church Committee, a decade after its publication, was "prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case material." The result was the best seller *The Penkovskiy Papers* (also serialized by Time Inc.). Now, after all the scourging of the intelligence services by the Church Committee and the other congressional inquisitions, the "Shevchenko papers" had publicly demonstrated the value of the CIA. By advancing the proposition that the CIA had bested the Russians in arms control by means of its notional supermole, the book seemed to justify, with a single stroke, the combined budgets of all the intelligence services.

FINALLY Ambassador Shevchenko, for his part, not only got the movie deal he had been interested in since his days at Mosfilm, but he received the public recognition in the United States as an arms control expert that he never had at the U.N.—or in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Ashbel Green, the editor, who began his efforts with Shevchenko's pro-Soviet disarmament book in 1974, wound up with an anti-Soviet international best seller. Knopf, the publisher, has sold 180,000 copies of *Breaking with Moscow*, as well as millions of dollars in subsidiary rights. *Time*, which did the cover story—as well as illustrations and fact-checking—excitedly presented its special feature to its readers. "It's always fascinating to look in these windows on history," said Executive Editor Ronald Kriss on the "Letter from the Publisher" page. "What we're trying to do is give our readers fresh insights and illuminations of the news, a dimension that is almost impossible to achieve by even the best weekly journalism."

One of the ghostwriters, Alfred Friendly Jr., according to *The Washington Post*, received $50,000. Judy Chavez, the 22-year-old call girl, with her celebrated blacksnake whip, received $35,000 for her services, as well as a Corvette and a Caribbean vacation. Georgy Arbatov, and his Institute of the United States and Canada, although losing a senior research fellow, could now claim that one of his former colleagues was a regular commentator "in place" on ABC News—and one of the United States's and Canada's foremost media experts on the Soviet Union. The FBI was able to end its expensive and exhaustive relations with the Fedora ring of disinformers. The American arms control community got an inside verifier of Soviet intentions concerning SALT I and SALT II, an extraordinary expert who uniquely could claim that he was at the politburo meetings, and could explain the real motives and "backup" positions of the Kremlin.

All in all, it was a curious but profitable partnership—especially since Shevchenko had spent the previous 20 years in America, albeit far less effectively, attempting to explain similar Soviet positions to Americans. The KGB was the only apparent loser in the affair. But its book has yet to be published.

Edward Jay Epstein is the author of *Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth* (Viking), *News from Nowhere* (Random House), and *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* (Reader's Digest Press), among other books, and is completing a book on international deception.